Legislature(2009 - 2010)CAPITOL 120
03/18/2009 01:00 PM House JUDICIARY
| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB15 | |
| HR7 | |
| HB140 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| *+ | HR 7 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| *+ | HB 140 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| += | HB 15 | TELECONFERENCED | |
HB 15 - BAN CELL PHONE USE BY MINORS WHEN DRIVING 1:11:17 PM CHAIR RAMRAS announced that the first order of business would be HOUSE BILL NO. 15, "An Act relating to prohibiting the use of cellular telephones by minors when driving a motor vehicle; and providing for an effective date." 1:11:28 PM REPRESENTATIVE DAHLSTROM made a motion to rescind the committee's action of 3/16/09 in reporting CSHB 15(JUD) from committee for the purposes of a specific amendment. There being no objection, HB 15, as amended by Amendment 1 on 3/16/09, was back before the committee. CHAIR RAMRAS directed the committee's attention to Amendment [2], labeled 26-LS011\E.1, Luckhaupt, 3/18/09, which clarifies that a peace office can make a stop authorized by law. 1:12:32 PM RICK SVOBODNY, Acting Attorney General, Department of Law (DOL), offered his understanding that the last time this legislation was before the committee there was debate as to whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion was required in these stops. He specified that it could be either. Therefore, Amendment 2 doesn't pick, and therefore the law remains the same for stops whether it's reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 1:13:27 PM CHAIR RAMRAS moved that the committee adopt Amendment [2], labeled 26-LS011\E.1, Luckhaupt, 3/18/09, which read: Page 1, lines 10-11: Delete "has probable cause" Insert "is authorized by law" REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES objected for the purpose of discussion. CHAIR RAMRAS requested that Acting Attorney General Svobodny delineate the difference between terms "probable cause" and "authorized by law". ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL SVOBODNY explained that probable cause, in simplistic terms, means more likely than not. Therefore, it's probable that a crime is being committed. However, reasonable suspicion is a lower standard in which a police officer can take into consideration several factors and determine there to be a suspicious circumstance. There may be legal disputes regarding what standard the law requires for an event when a car is stopped. The adoption of Amendment 2 would leave the determination with the court and case law that exists now. The problem, he explained, arises, because it's a secondary event. The police aren't supposed to stop people as an underage person using a cell phone. The stop would be for driving under the influence, reckless driving, or speeding. CHAIR RAMRAS surmised then that this is a narrow policy call to determine whether the standard is probable cause or authorized by law. ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL SVOBODNY relayed that the DOL views [Amendment 2] as a way not to choose between the two standards but rather leave it up to the court. The committee took an at-ease from 1:18 p.m. to 1:19 p.m. CHAIR RAMRAS withdrew his motion to adopt Amendment [2]. There being no objection, HB 15, as amended, was before the committee. CHAIR RAMRAS made a motion that the committee rescind its action on 3/16/09 in adopting Amendment 1. There being no objection, it was so ordered, and HB 15 was before the committee. 1:20:54 PM CHAIR RAMRAS again made a motion to adopt Amendment 2, labeled 26-LS011\E.1, Luckhaupt, 3/18/09. [Text provided previously.] REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES objected for the purpose of discussion. ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL SVOBODNY related that the department believes that the law as it applies today to stops should apply to HB 15. Amendment 2 would accomplish the aforementioned. In further response, Acting Attorney General Svobodny clarified that the adoption of Amendment 2 would maintain a police officer's ability to stop a vehicle for probable cause because that's the law as it applies today. "And so, this language [with the adoption of Amendment 2] says that whatever the law is today, whether it's reasonable suspicion or probable cause, that would be the law as it relates to minors using a cell phone," he explained. REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said he would have interpreted the phrase "as authorized by law" to mean as authorized by law at the time of the trial not frozen in time at today. He suggested that to interpret the language as Acting Attorney General Svobodny does it should say, "was authorized by law on the date of enactment". CHAIR RAMRAS inquired as to which standard Representative Gruenberg preferred. REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said that he prefers the language "authorized by law" as inserted by Amendment 2. However, he highlighted the importance of clarifying the legislative history with regard to the time to which the law refers. ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL SVOBODNY stated, "Either we know it today because there's a case that's decided on a particular fact pattern or it's going to be new law a year from now when the kid gets stopped with the phone." 1:24:50 PM REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES surmised that the intent of [Amendment 2] is that whatever the underlying law required to stop an individual for whatever reason applies. ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL SVOBODNY replied yes. REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES clarified then that there's no attempt to lower the standard, but rather to defer the discussion. ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL SVOBODNY noted his agreement that it's not an attempt to lower or raise the standard. REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES pointed out that the legislation creates a secondary offense and the language in HB 15 is identical, using probable cause, to the seat belt and booster seat sections. CHAIR RAMRAS interjected and asked if Representative Holmes approves Amendment [2] or not. REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES said that she didn't know. 1:26:37 PM CHAIR RAMRAS announced that HB 15 would be set aside [with the motion to adopt Amendment 2 left pending].